October 15, 2023 at 10:06 am #1101ilenehay8936421Participant
<br> The same goes for CPU-intensive processes; while these aren’t network problems, they can cause your page-load speed to slow down. Example: Consider a network with two hosts, A and B. Host A wants to send a file to host B. The host-to-host layer in host A will break the file into smaller segments, add error correction and flow control information, and then transmit the segments over the network to host B. The host-to-host layer in host B will receive the segments, check for errors, and reassemble the file. If a Web developer has poorly coded an application, an administrator 인터넷 (i was reading this) hasn’t set permissions properly, and/or security is ineffective, a hacker might be able to do what he or she wants using forms that accept user input or URLs that accept parameters. I both know and believe enough to explain how the fears it provokes are mostly less scary than they seem, although in some cases also more scary than you might realize, but that either way the joys are even more transformational. Assuming that authoritarian leaders are first and foremost concerned with accumulating political power as well as maintaining the regime in which they operate (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Geddes et al., 2014), owning shares of telecommunications companies enables the incumbent ruler to implement strategies of digital repression more effectively.
We therefore expect the relationship between foreign ISP ownership and corruption to vary across regime types of the investor’s home country, as stipulated by our second expectation: With increasing participation of foreign-authoritarian (foreign-democratic) investors, the diffusion of mobile phones increases (decreases) corruption more substantially. First, the higher the share of foreign investors, the stronger the negative relationship between mobile penetration and corruption (Model 2). Second, the regime type of the investor also moderates this relationship. To demonstrate the potential of the TOSCO dataset, we ran two illustrative regression analyses on the relationship between internet penetration and democratic change and corruption, respectively. These two streams of information take up a lot of room, which standard communication wires like phone lines can’t handle. State governments can own shares of a company either directly (i.e. by the central government itself) or indirectly (i.e. through other state-owned companies like pension funds, national banks, political parties or other state-owned institutions such as the National Petroleum Corporation in Ghana).<br>>
For example, Chinese companies have built large networks of fibre optics in Africa, on which many local ISPs rely (Gagliardone & Geall, 2014), and content providers like Google, Facebook, or Amazon seek to set up their own independent networks (Nothias, 2020). It yet remains to be studied whether and how this diversification of internet infrastructure and the role of new players emerging in the field will change ISPs’ control over access to the internet in the long run. These plans vary based on local search, metropolitan or regional search and national search. I considered pricing, internet speeds, channel selection, national availability and more when evaluating bundles from the top providers. The findings call for a more thorough investigation of the conditions under which state control by ownership can support or challenge authoritarian rule. Therefore, a state government’s ability to control access to the internet and its use, or its interruption, depends on the extent to which it controls the ISPs that grant internet access to customers on its te<br>o<br>
In any case, these developments signal that the telecommunications sector in African countries, and in particular the question of who owns and therefore controls the infrastructure, continues to be an exciting laboratory for studies of the determinants and effects of internet penetration. Rød and Weidmann (2015) approach this question by way of a two-step analysis. The findings from our replications of the studies by Rød and Weidmann (2015) and by Bailard (2009), on a sub-sample of African countries, and including the theoretically appropriate aggregate of our ISP ownership variable, indeed suggest that both political effects of the internet systematically vary with the ownership of those companies providing internet access, controlling for a country’s level of internet penetration. Footnote 7 Following Bailard, we include the corruption perception index (CPI) as dependent variable, using an inverted score such that higher values indicate higher levels of perceived corruption. In more detail, following the power-to logic, we propose that if the state has substantial influence over the internet-providing companies, it has a higher capacity to control internet-based communication and information and hence to use internet services for its own benefits. If you use your cell phone to ask your spouse to go to the store or the conduct of international affairs, these devices within range become an integral part o<br>ciety.
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